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Credit Card Transfers, Preferences or Protected: 
Survey of a Failed Challenge 
Hon. Laurel Myerson Isicoff* 
Terry Ryan** 
“Transfer your high interest rate credit card debt to THIS card and you 
will not pay any interest for six months.”  When the credit card holder ac-
cepts that offer, and transfers that balance, one bank gets paid, and the other 
gets a new credit card customer.  But if the credit card customer then files 
bankruptcy, should the paid bank have to give the customer’s bankruptcy 
trustee the money it received from the paying bank?  According to three 
circuit courts, the answer is “yes.”  On June 18, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit1 
joined the Sixth2 and Tenth Circuits3 holding that credit card balance trans-
fers can be avoided as preferences because a debtor’s transfer of a credit 
card balance from one bank to another constitutes “a transfer of an interest 
of the debtor in property.”  Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court denied a 
petition for certification of the case from the Marshall decision in the Tenth 
Circuit.4  These cases reflect a series of defeats for banks seeking to protect 
their winnings from the game of bankruptcy musical chairs.  
I.  PREFERENCES IN GENERAL 
A trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate – 
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property –  
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before 
such transfer was made; 
                                                                                                                           
 
*
 Judge Isicoff is a United States Bankruptcy Judge in the Southern District of Florida.  Prior to 
becoming a judge, Judge Isicoff practiced bankruptcy law for approximately 25 years.  
 
**
  Terry Ryan, a 2002 graduate of the Northwestern University School of Law and a 2008 gradu-
ate of the NYU Stern School of Business, is Judge Isicoff’s current law clerk.  
 
1
 Bank of Am., N.A. v. Mukamal (In re Egidi) (Egidi II), 571 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 
2
 MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Meoli (In re Wells), 561 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2009); Yoppolo v. 
MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. (In re Dilworth), 560 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 
3
 Marshall v. FIA Card Servs. (In re Marshall) (Marshall III), 550 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 
4
 Marshall III, 550 F.3d 1251, cert. denied, 77 U.S.L.W. 3703 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 08-
1329). 
124 FIU Law Review [5:123 
 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made –  
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; or 
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the fil-
ing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of the transfer 
was an insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor 
would receive if –  
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent 
provided by the provisions of this title. 
Whether a challenged transfer involves an interest of the debtor in 
property is a threshold issue that must be resolved prior to reaching any of 
the elements of, or defenses to, a preference action.5  The common, or one 
might speculate, shared, defenses raised by the banks are that a credit card 
balance transfer does not involve “an interest of a debtor in property;” that a 
credit card balance transfer does not diminish the bankruptcy estate; that the 
transfer is protected by the earmarking doctrine; and that a bank-to-bank 
transfer is really a debt swap agreement and therefore exempt from most of 
the chapter 5 provisions including § 547.  In this article we will explore all 
these defenses and the reasons why they have been unanimously rejected by 
each appellate court that has considered the issue.  
II.  INTEREST OF A DEBTOR IN PROPERTY 
What constitutes a property interest is generally governed by state 
law.6  However, courts must “still look to federal bankruptcy law to resolve 
the extent to which that interest is property of the estate.”7  While the thre-
shold issue in § 547, whether an interest of the debtor in property has been 
transferred, is a state law inquiry, the relevancy and extent of that determi-
nation in bankruptcy law is focused on that transfer’s impact on the bank-
ruptcy estate and is therefore informed by federal law. 
                                                                                                                           
 
5
 McLemore v. Third Nat’l Bank (In re Montgomery), 983 F.2d 1389, 1392 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 
6
 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 593 (1992). 
 
7
 Marshall III, 550 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Bailey v. Big Sky Motors, Ltd. (In re Ogden), 314 F.3d 
1190 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
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Credit card relationships are governed by state and federal law.  There 
are actually four separate relationships in a credit card transaction—the 
customer and the issuing bank; the customer and the merchant; the bank 
and the merchant; and the issuing bank and the merchant’s bank.8  The rela-
tionship between the customer and the bank is governed primarily by state 
and federal consumer protection regulations,9 as well as state contract law.  
The relationship between the credit card bank and the merchant’s bank is 
set forth in an interchange agreement,10 that is, a contract, which, in turn, is 
also governed primarily by state law.   
In order to start this analysis, the property interest must be identified.  
The property interest is the credit facility made available to a credit card 
customer from the credit card issuing bank.11  Each court has identified this 
property interest—the available credit—as an interest of the debtor in prop-
erty because the debtor exercised control over the use of the credit.  Control 
is defined in each instance as control of the disposition of the money 
represented by the credit, not physical possession of the money. 
In Egidi II, the Eleventh Circuit held that a debtor’s control of funds 
was dispositive of the issue of property.12  In support, the Eleventh Circuit 
cited its earlier case on fraudulent transfers, Nordberg v. Sanchez (In re 
Chase & Sanborn Corp.):13  
[A]ny funds under the control of the debtor, regardless of the source, 
are property deemed to be the debtor’s property, and any transfers that 
diminish that property are subject to avoidance.14  
In Wells,15 the court, referring to an earlier Sixth Circuit case on check 
kiting,16 held that a payment received by one credit card bank through con-
venience checks issued from another credit card bank, was subject to avoid-
ance as a preference because of the debtor’s control over the use of the 
fund:   
                                                                                                                           
 
8
 BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, LAW OF BANK DEP. COLL. & CR. CARDS ¶15.02[4] 
(A.S. Pratt & Sons 2009). 
 
9
 See, e.g., Truth-in-Lending-Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1642 (2006); Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.13 
(2009); and the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 – 1693r (2006). 
 
10
 Id. 
 
11
 Manchester v. First Bank & Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 649 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) 
(“Generally, a new creditor’s unconditioned promise to loan a debtor money to pay the debtor’s antece-
dent debt is property in which the debtor holds an interest, as are the proceeds of the loan once it is 
made.”). 
 
12
 Bank of Am., N.A. v. Mukamal (In re Egidi) (Egidi II), 571 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 
13
 813 F.2d 1177 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 
14
 Egidi II, 571 F.3d at 1160. 
 
15
 Meoli v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. (In re Wells), 382 B.R. 355 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.2008). 
 
16
 McLemore v. Third Nat’l Bank (In re Montgomery), 983 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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While it is true that a debtor’s potential credit (i.e., an offer of credit) 
is not an equitable interest that becomes property of the estate, if the 
debtor accepts the offer prepetition or exercises a contract right to bor-
row funds from a credit card account, the debtor then has at least an 
equitable interest in the funds.  This is true even if the debtor never 
receives the funds but only exercises control over disposition of the 
funds.17  
In Dilworth,18 the Sixth Circuit held that a credit card balance transfer 
was preferential because the debtor decided how the paying bank funds 
would be used “and the economic result is the same as if Citi had handed 
(the Debtor) currency that she immediately handed over to MBNA.”19 
The credit card banks argue that control should not be relevant unless 
the transfer actually diminishes what would otherwise be part of the bank-
ruptcy estate.  The banks’ support for this argument is found in Begier v. 
I.R.S.20  In Begier, the Supreme Court held that funds collected to pay “trust 
fund taxes” that is, withheld federal income and FICA taxes and excise tax-
es, were not property of the estate and therefore the debtor’s prepetition 
payment of those taxes did not constitute an avoidable preference.  In mak-
ing its determination the Court observed that “property of the debtor”21 is 
not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, however, 
[B]ecause the purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the 
property includable within the bankruptcy estate – the property avail-
able for distribution to creditors – “property of the debtor” subject to 
                                                                                                                           
 
17
 In re Wells, 382 B.R. at 362. 
 
18
 Yoppolo v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. (In re Dilworth), 560 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 
19
 Id.; see also Marshall III noting: 
Technology masks the processes involved here.  Separating them into constituent elements reveals 
a sequence of events, not just one.  Debtors drew on their Capital One line of credit; that draw 
converted available credit into a loan; Debtors directed Capital One to use the loan proceeds to pay 
MBNA, and Capital One complied.  It is essentially the same as if Debtors had drawn on their 
Capital One line of credit, deposited the proceeds into an account within their control, and then 
wrote a check to MBNA.  The latter is clearly a preference. 
Marshall v. FIA Card Servs. (In re Marshall) (Marshall III), 550 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 
20
 Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53 (1990). 
 
21
 The phrase “transfer of an interest of the debtor in property” found in section 547(b) is not 
expressly defined in the Code, but it is “well established that it is broadly defined, and guidance is to be 
drawn from the definition of ‘property of the estate’ set forth in § 541(a).”  Manchester v. First Bank & 
Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 645 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000).  As noted by the Supreme Court in 
Begier the phrase “property of the debtor” was changed in the 1984 amendments to section 547(b) to the 
phrase “an interest of the debtor in property” for the purpose of creating consistency with the language 
of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) which defines “property of the estate,” subject to enumerated exceptions, as 
“all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”  Thus “an 
interest of the debtor in property” is “coextensive with ‘interests of the debtor in property’ as that term is 
used in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1).”  Begier, 496 U.S. at 59, n.3. 
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the preferential transfer provision is best understood as that property 
that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred be-
fore the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.22 
Relying on this language, the credit card banks have argued that the 
debtor’s bankruptcy estate cannot possibly be diminished when a borrower 
uses one credit card to pay another credit card.  Before the bankruptcy the 
debtor owed a certain amount to one bank and by virtue of the balance 
transfer merely has substituted one creditor for another but has not other-
wise impacted the assets that would otherwise be included in the property 
of the estate.  
Each of the appellate courts has rejected this argument as well.  In 
each case the court has expressed the view that with the available credit the 
debtor could have used the funds for other purposes, for example, purchas-
ing assets, and therefore, since the money was not used to purchase an asset 
that would have then become an asset of the bankruptcy estate, the bank-
ruptcy estate has been diminished.23 
The premise that a borrower’s use of available credit is property of the 
borrower subject to preference recovery is not a new concept.  The Sixth 
Circuit B.A.P., the Sixth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit each referred to, and 
relied on, the holdings in Montgomery24 and In re Smith,25 where the debtors 
obtained “involuntary” credit.  Smith involved a check kiting scheme.  
Looking at Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Indiana 
Code, the court held that a debtor’s use of loan proceeds constitutes a prop-
erty interest, and that provisional credit provided by a bank, appropriately 
or otherwise, is similar to making a loan.26  The court further opined that 
“[w]hen, however, the customer has ‘withdrawn or applied’ the provisional-
ly credited funds, the bank’s interest rises to a security interest in the item 
or proceeds thereof.”27  The court observed that “the Debtor exercised do-
minion and control over the funds by making actual payment to a creditor.  
                                                                                                                           
 
22
 Begier, 496 U.S. at 58. 
 
23
 See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Mukamal (In re Egidi) (Egidi II), 571 F.3d 1156, 1161 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“Once the credit card companies extended the lines of credit to Egidi, she could have paid other 
creditors or purchased other assets that would have become part of the estate and been available to other 
creditors.  Because Egidi chose to pay MBNA from the lines of credit, the other creditors were denied 
payment or an opportunity for payment.”); Boeing Wichita Credit Union v. Parks (In re Fox), No. 08-
1053-EFM, 2009 WL 539921, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 2009) (“[A] debtor’s transfer of property was a 
transfer of ‘an interest of the debtor in property’ if it deprived the bankruptcy estate of resources which 
would have otherwise been used to satisfy the claim of creditors.”). 
 
24
 McLemore v. Third Nat’l Bank (In re Montgomery), 983 F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 
25
 In re Smith, 966 F.2d 1527 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 
26
 Id. at 1530. 
 
27
 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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The Debtor surely had something of value during the period when the Bank 
was extending the provisional credit.”28 
In Montgomery the bankruptcy trustee also sought to recover an al-
leged preferential transfer arising in the debtor’s check kiting scheme.29  
The defendant bank argued that the funds it received from the payor bank 
were not the debtor’s property because the payor bank had honored a trans-
fer to the defendant bank by giving provisional credit to a deposit that later 
was dishonored by the bank that issued the dishonored check, in other 
words, there was never any money that actually belonged to the debtor.  The 
Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant bank’s argument that the “property” 
transferred were funds that belonged to the issuing bank, holding that the 
debtor’s property interest in the, albeit illegally obtained, provisional credit 
was dependent on the extent to which the debtor exercised control over the 
proceeds of the credit.30 
                                                                                                                           
 
28
 Id. at 1531.  Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code assumes that when a check is depo-
sited for payment, it will be paid by its drawer.  NBT Bank, NA v. First Nat’l Community Bank, 393 
F.3d 404, 407 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004).  When each collecting bank forwards a check, it receives provisional 
credit from its transferee.  See section 4-201(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code which provides, in 
pertinent part, that 
[u]nless a contrary intent clearly appears and before the time that a settlement given by a collecting 
bank for an item is or becomes final, the bank, with respect to the item, is an agent or sub-agent of 
the owner of the item and any settlement given for the item is provisional.   
U.C.C. § 4-201(a) (2005).   
 
Section 4-214 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:  
If a collecting bank has made provisional settlement with its customer for an item and fails by rea-
son of dishonor, suspension of payments by a bank, or otherwise to receive settlement for the item 
which is or becomes final, the bank may revoke the settlement given by it, charge back the amount 
of any credit given for the item to its customer's account, or obtain refund from its customer, 
whether or not it is able to return the item, if by its midnight deadline or within a longer reasonable 
time after it learns the facts it returns the item or sends notification of the facts.  If the return or no-
tice is delayed beyond the bank's midnight deadline or a longer reasonable time after it learns the 
facts, the bank may revoke the settlement, charge back the credit, or obtain refund from its cus-
tomer, but it is liable for any loss resulting from the delay. 
U.C.C. § 4-214(a) (2005).  Thus, the U.C.C. recognizes that even the provisional credit is available for a 
customer’s use.  If the item for which provisional credit was given is dishonored, the dishonor creates a 
debt from the customer to the bank which then must be repaid either by revocation, charge back or, if 
the funds are no longer in the account, a refund from the customer to the bank.  These provisions of the 
U.C.C. are consistent with the cases’ holdings that the use by a debtor of provisional credit, whether 
through a bad check, or a credit card facility, is a property interest. 
 
29
 In re Montgomery, 983 F.2d at 1390-92. 
 
30
 In re Montgomery, 983 F.2d at 1395-96; see also Manchester v. First Bank & Trust Co. (In re 
Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 649 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he transfer diminished the debtor’s estate be-
cause the trust loan proceeds that would have been available to a pool of creditors were paid to one 
creditor – the Bank.”). 
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Thus, what is determinative is that the debtor had a resource, the avail-
ability of credit, however obtained, which resource was available to all of 
the debtor’s creditors until the debtor directed that resource to the payment 
of only one particular creditor.  That act of direction is the diminution in the 
estate that the courts have characterized as a “transfer of an interest of the 
debtor in property.”31 
III.  THE EARMARKING DOCTRINE 
Another defense that has been raised by the credit card companies is 
the earmarking doctrine.  Early forms of the earmarking doctrine have ap-
peared in the courts since at least 1912.32  Most courts and commentators 
have held the view that the earmarking doctrine is essentially a “judicial 
creation.”33  However, some have speculated that the doctrine was actually 
subsumed by the Bankruptcy Code and that earmarking is an argument 
“arising out of the language in § 547(b) which requires that, as an element 
of the trustee’s proof, recovery be based upon a transfer of an interest of the 
debtor.”34  In fact, at least two scholars have argued that the earmarking 
doctrine is actually a version of the “contemporaneous exchange” defense 
codified under § 547(c)(1) of the Code.35  Carlson and Widen have posited 
that as long as the debtor and the original creditor intend that a transfer to 
the original creditor be contemporaneous with new value given to the deb-
                                                                                                                           
 
31
 In re Montgomery, 983 F.2d at 1392.  A variation on this theme is the bank to bank transfer 
defense.  The credit card banks argue that the mere substitution of one creditor for another does not 
diminish the Estate.  This argument was expressly rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Bank of America, 
N.A. v. Mukamal (In re Egidi) (Egidi II), 571 F.3d 1156, 1163 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because Egidi directed 
the payment and the money could have been used to satisfy other creditors . . . the transfers were not 
bank to bank transfers that amounted to a mere substitutions of creditors outside the control of the deb-
tor.”) (citations omitted).  
 
32
 The Bohlen Court noted that “[e]quivalent language” had existed in the Bankruptcy Act for 
many years. McCuskey v. Nat’l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters.), 859 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 
1988) (citing Nat’l Bank of Newport v. Nat’l Herkimer County Bank, 225 U.S. 178, 182 (1912)). 
 
33
 See David Gray Carlson & William H. Widen, The Earmarking Defense to Voidable Preference 
Liability: A Reconceptualization, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591 (1999); see also Schubert v. Lucent Techs., 
Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’ns, Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 400 (3d Cir. 2009); Gray v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re 
Neponsit River Paper Co.), 231 B.R. 829 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999); McCuskey v. Nat’l Bank of Waterloo 
(In re Bohlen), 859 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 
34
 Stingley v. AlliedSignal, Inc. (In re Libby Int’l, Inc.), 247 B.R. 463, 467 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000). 
 
35
 Carlson & Widen, supra note 35, at 592.  Section 547(c)(1) provides that: 
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer – 
(1) to the extent that such a transfer was – 
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made 
to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and 
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange. 
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (2009). 
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tor, such a transfer will be protected by § 547(c)(1).36  Under this Code-
based argument, it is not necessary that the original creditor provide the 
new value to the debtor, but simply that new value, from any source, be 
provided to the debtor.  
 
Under the earmarking doctrine, funds provided by a third party to a 
debtor to pay a specific debt to a designated creditor will not be avoided as 
a preferential payment under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).37  Commentators and 
courts have noted that the theory underlying the earmarking doctrine is es-
sentially that since the transferred funds were never property of the debtor 
to begin with, the creditors as a whole are not harmed by the transfer and 
therefore, there has been no diminution of the estate.38  Originally, the ear-
marking doctrine was limited to cases in which the new lender who ad-
vanced the funds to pay off the existing debt was also obliged to the origi-
nal creditor as a guarantor or surety.39  The application of this doctrine was 
eventually extended to cover cases in which the lender “was not a guarantor 
or surety but rather provided funds to the debtor for the purpose of paying a 
specific indebtedness.”40  The apparent trend most courts have followed is 
to not limit the application of the earmarking doctrine to those situations in 
which the new creditor is “secondarily liable for the earlier debt,” but to 
also apply it to situations where any third party makes a payment to a credi-
tor on behalf of a debtor and where such payments have no effect on the 
estate of the debtor.41   
                                                                                                                           
 
36
 In re Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 593. 
 
37
 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 547.03[2], at 547-24 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
15th ed. 2002). 
 
38
 Id.; see also Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir. 
1986) (“The earmarking doctrine is widely accepted in bankruptcy courts as a valid defense against a 
preference claim, primarily because the assets from the third party were never in control of the debtor 
and therefore payment of these assets to a creditor in no way diminishes the debtor’s estate.”) 
 
39
 Marshall v. FIA Card Servs. (In re Marshall) (Marshall III), 550 F.3d 1251, 1257 n.5 (10th Cir. 
2008).  
 
40
 Id.  This extension of the earmarking doctrine was criticized extensively in In re Moses.  Ob-
serving its judicially-created origin, the Moses court noted that a new creditor, who was acting as a 
guarantor to an existing debt, and who had provided funds to the debtor to pay that debt, might be sub-
ject to double liability if the transfer were avoided.  Manchester v. First Bank & Trust Co. (In re Moses), 
256 B.R. 641, 646 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000).  Citing Bohlen, the Moses court noted that “[w]here there is 
no is no guarantor, the earmarking doctrine does not help either the new creditor or the debtor.  In fact 
the new creditor is harmed . . . [t]he only person aided by the doctrine is the old creditor, who had noth-
ing to do with earmarking the funds.”  Id. at 647 (citing In re Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 566). 
 
41
 Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat’l Bank (In re Heitkamp), 137 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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Application of the earmarking doctrine is “inherently fact based.”42  In 
assessing the validity of the earmarking doctrine, the court “must determine 
the precise agreement between the debtor and the transferor of property in 
order to determine whether the debtor ever acquired an interest in the prop-
erty that was transferred.”43  Procedurally, the trustee bears the initial bur-
den of establishing that a transfer is avoidable under § 547(b).44  However, 
there appears to be a split among the courts as to which party has the bur-
den of proving whether the earmarking doctrine applies (or does not ap-
ply).45 
One of the seminal cases in the development of the earmarking doc-
trine is the Bohlen case out of the Eighth Circuit.46  In Bohlen, the Chapter 7 
trustee brought an adversary proceeding against the debtor to recover alle-
gedly preferential transfers made from borrowed funds.  The debtor owed 
two separate obligations, totaling $189,000 and $125,000 respectively, to 
the National Bank of Waterloo (“the bank”).47  The debtor applied for a loan 
in the amount of $200,000 from the John Deere Community Credit Union 
(“the credit union”) to pay off the $189,000 obligation owed to the bank.48  
In his application, the debtor indicated that he would use the loan proceeds 
to pay off his $125,000 obligation and use the remainder for miscellaneous 
purposes.49  In fact, the debtor never mentioned his other $189,000 obliga-
tion.50  Instead of using the loan proceeds to pay the $125,000 obligation, as 
stipulated, the debtor proceeded to pay off his $189,000 obligation and the 
interest which had accumulated on the loan.51  The trustee commenced an 
adversary proceeding against the bank alleging that the payment of the 
$189,000 loan constituted a preferential transfer.52  The bank argued that the 
moneys advanced to it were protected by the earmarking doctrine and there-
fore, were never property of the debtor’s estate.53  Both the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                           
 
42
 Tolz v. Barnett Bank of S. Fla. (In re Safe-T-Brake of S. Fla., Inc.), 162 B.R. 359, 363 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that the debtor in question had no interest in the loan proceeds provided by the 
new creditor). 
 
43
 Id. 
 
44
 Metcalf v. Golden (In re Adbox, Inc.), 488 F.3d 836, 842 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 
45
 Some courts hold that the trustee bears the burden of demonstrating the earmarking doctrine 
does not apply.  See, e.g., In re Heitkamp, 137 F.3d at 1089.  Others contend that the defendant bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the doctrine does apply.  See, e.g., In re Adbox, Inc., 488 F.3d at 841. 
 
46
 McCuskey v. Nat’l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen) 859 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 
47
 Id. at 562. 
 
48
 Id. 
 
49
 Id. 
 
50
 Id. 
 
51
 Id. 
 
52
 Id. at 564. 
 
53
 Id. 
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court and district court held that a portion of the transfer was not avoidable 
pursuant to the earmarking doctrine.54   
The Bohlen Court began its analysis by noting that the earmarking 
doctrine is entirely a judicial creation and that, at its core, all earmarking 
cases must necessarily involve at least three parties – the “old creditor,” the 
“new lender” and the debtor.55  The court proceeded to articulate the three-
part earmarking test which has subsequently been followed by courts in a 
number of circuits.56  To qualify for earmarking, the following requirements 
must be present: 
(1) the existence of an agreement between the new lender and the 
debtor that the new funds will be used to pay a specified antecedent 
debt,57 
(2) performance of that agreement according to its terms, and  
(3) the transaction viewed as a whole (including transfer in of the 
new funds and the transfer out to the old creditor) does not result in 
any diminution of the estate.58   
In applying the three-part test, the appellate court noted that the second 
element was not satisfied, reasoning that “[i]t cannot be disputed that the 
agreement between the parties was that part of the proceeds of the credit 
union’s new loan would be used to pay the $125,000 obligation.”59   
The Bohlen court then turned to the issue of whether of the debtor had 
“control” over the funds provided by the new lender.  Interestingly, the is-
sue of “control,” whether constructive or actual, is not a specific element in 
the Bohlen earmarking test.  The court briefly addressed the issue by con-
cluding that “[o]ne cannot conceive of greater or more telling ‘control’ of 
                                                                                                                           
 
54
 Id.  Judge Wood, in his bankruptcy court decision, focused on the intent of the credit union to 
have the funds used to satisfy the debtor’s $125,000 obligation as the key reason why earmarking ap-
plied.  Huisinga v. Nat’l Bank of Waterloo, 78 B.R. 556, 559 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1987), rev’d, 859 F.2d 
561 (8th Cir. 1988).  Without much analysis, the district court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s deci-
sion to apply earmarking.  McCuskey v. Nat’l Bank of Waterloo, 91 B.R. 486 (N.D. Iowa 1987), rev’d, 
859 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 
55
 In re Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 565. 
 
56
 See Lisa G. Beckerman & Robert J. Stark, Structuring Workout Settlements Premised on the 
“Earmarking” Doctrine, 26 CAL. BANKR. J. 105, 115 (2002) (noting that the Third and Eighth Circuits 
have adopted the Bohlen framework).  Courts which have adopted the Bohlen standard include the 
Eighth Circuit in Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat’l Bank (In re Heitkamp), 137 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998), the 
Third Circuit in Schubert v. Lucent Techs., Inc. (In re Winstar Commc’ns, Inc.), 554 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 
2009), and the Sixth Circuit in Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458 
(6th Cir. 2008). 
 
57
 The court noted that when the guarantor pays the original creditor directly, it is unnecessary 
that an agreement exist between the new lender and the debtor. 
 
58
 In re Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 566.   
 
59
 Id. at 567. 
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the new funds by the debtor than to have the debtor use them for its own 
purposes and in violation of its agreement with the new lender.”60   
Ultimately, the court held that earmarking did not apply because the 
transaction did not satisfy the three-part test and because the debtor exhi-
bited sufficient control to preclude earmarking.61  In his dissent, Judge 
McMillan focused on the intent of the credit union when it transferred funds 
to the debtor.  In concluding that earmarking did apply, Judge McMillan 
noted that the credit union made its check payable to the debtor and the 
bank jointly and therefore, the funds were never property of the debtor.62  
This “intent” based approach has not been followed by any appellate 
court.63 
An alternative earmarking test, focusing on the control element, has 
been embraced by several courts.64  An example of the application of the 
“control test” is In re Neponset River Co. decided by the First Circuit Bank-
ruptcy Appellate Panel.65  The panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s deci-
sion to avoid a pre-petition payment to an insurance company for the pay-
ment of worker’s compensation insurance premiums.  In Neponset, the par-
ties agreed that all the elements of a preference action under § 547(b) were 
met except for the requirement that the transfer constituted a transfer of an 
interest in the debtor’s property.66  The court began its analysis by noting 
that “[t]he main inquiry in determining whether an alleged preference in-
volved an ‘interest of the debtor in property’ is whether the property trans-
ferred would have been part of the bankruptcy estate had it not been trans-
ferred before the petition date.”67  The insurance company creditor receiving 
the funds contended that the money used to make the payment belonged to 
a third party who issued the money on the debtor’s behalf and consequently, 
                                                                                                                           
 
60
 Id. 
 
61
 Id. 
 
62
 Id. at 569. 
 
63
 See, e.g., Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(noting that dispositive control, and not lender intent, is the key factor in determining the applicability of 
the earmarking doctrine).  The courts that have adopted the “intent” approach have been subsequently 
reversed.  See, e.g., infra note 116. 
 
64
 See, e.g., McLemore v. Third Nat’l Bank (In re Montgomery), 983 F.2d 1389, 1395 (6th Cir. 
1993) (rejecting the earmarking argument because the debtor “exercised significant control” and that the 
debtor had the power to pay off any number of creditors); In re Smith, 966 F.2d 1527, 1531 (7th Cir. 
1992) (also rejecting the earmarking argument and concluding that “[t]he real question . . . [was] wheth-
er the Debtor was actually able to exercise sufficient dominion and control over the funds to demon-
strate an interest in property”). 
 
65
 Gray v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re Neponsit River Paper Co.), 231 B.R. 829 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 
1999). 
 
66
 Id. at 832. 
 
67
 Id. at 833. 
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the transfer never involved an interest of the debtor in property.68  The 
creditor also argued that the debtor had no control over the funds noting 
that the debtor’s majority shareholder exercised control over the disburse-
ment of the monies.69  
In its earmarking analysis, the Neponset court strayed from the tradi-
tional Bohlen approach by adopting two additional factors in evaluating 
whether earmarking should apply: (1) the absence of control by the debtor 
over the disposition of funds, and (2) no diminution of the debtor’s estate as 
a result of the transfer.70  Although the court acknowledged the general use-
fulness of the Bohlen test, it explicitly added the control element that had 
been absent under Bohlen.  Under this new framework, the Neponset court 
held that the funds were not earmarked because the debtor controlled the 
disposition of the funds and that there no was evidence that the debtor had 
entered into an agreement with a third party regarding the use of the funds.71  
Moreover, the court concluded that the transfer did result in a diminution of 
the debtor’s estate observing that had the debtor not made the payment in 
question, the funds “would have been an asset of the debtor’s bankruptcy 
estate and available for payment to other creditors.”72 
This concept of debtor control appears central in most courts’ analysis 
of the applicability of the earmarking defense.73  In Coral Petroleum, the 
Fifth Circuit undertook a detailed analysis of the control aspect of the ear-
marking defense in a case where certain collateral pledged by the debtor’s 
subsidiary was set aside for repayment of an existing loan.74  The creditors’ 
committee argued that the funds were essentially “uncontrolled” by the 
debtor since the subsidiary and the debtor merely had an “understanding” 
                                                                                                                           
 
68
 Id. 
 
69
 Id. at 834. 
 
70
 Id. at 834-35. 
 
71
 Id. at 835. 
 
72
 Id. 
 
73
 Other courts that have placed great emphasis on the “control” determination include Herzog v. 
Sunarhauserman (In re Network 90 Degrees, Inc.), 126 B.R. 990 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (finding it critical that 
the debtor never had control over the transferred funds in determining that earmarking applied); In re 
Barefoot Cottages Dev. Co., No. 09-50089-LMK, 2009 WL 2842735 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. July 28, 2009) 
(holding that funds were earmarked in situation where debtor never had any dispositive control over 
funds and the debtor never posted any money or collateral to secure the loan); and New York City 
Shoes, Inc. v. Best Shoe Corp. (In re New York City Shoes, Inc.), 98 B.R. 725, 730 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1989) (concluding that “if the debtor . . . has control over the use of the funds, including the full discre-
tion to retain the funds if it wishes to do so, the payment of funds over to a creditor diminishes the 
debtor’s estate”).  But see Stingley v. AlliedSignal, Inc. (In re Libby Int’l, Inc.), 247 B.R. 463, 379 
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000), holding that “control over the [transferred] funds is not dispositive, the net effect 
of the transfer of the estate is.” 
 
74
 Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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that the funds would be used in a certain manner.75  The court disagreed and 
noted that the subsidiary’s collateral was “at all times restricted for the se-
curity and the eventual repayment of [the debtor’s] loan.”76  To conclude 
otherwise, the court reasoned, would be to “elevate form over substance.”77  
The court noted that even though the funds were placed in the debtor’s gen-
eral account, the original lender had full legal control over the funds.78  Fur-
thermore, the court found it unnecessary to inquire into the lender’s intent 
when it was clear that the debtor never had any actual access to the funds 
because of the simultaneous bookkeeping system employed.79  Although the 
Coral Petroleum court engaged in a detailed analysis of the control test, it 
also introduced what is probably the most liberal standard in evaluating the 
earmarking doctrine—the diminution of the estate test.80  In arriving at its 
decision, the court observed that in order for a transfer to be avoided, it is 
“essential that the debtor have an interest in the property transferred so that 
the estate is thereby diminished.”81 
Several other courts have also applied the diminution of the estate 
test.82  Some courts have applied the earmarking doctrine “when facts dem-
onstrate that the lender dictated the recipient of the funds that would not 
have otherwise been provided to the debtor but for the agreement to pay the 
funds to the designated recipient, and where the funds were in fact so 
paid.”83  The justification for the earmarking doctrine is based on the idea 
that the funds transferred “never become[] part of the debtor’s assets” but 
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 Id. at 1359. 
 
76
 Id. 
 
77
 Id. 
 
78
 Id. at 1361. 
 
79
 Id. 
 
80
 Judge Isicoff, in the In re Egidi bankruptcy court decision, noted that the Coral Petroleum court 
focused on whether the substitution of one creditor for another diminishes the debtor’s estate.  Mukamal 
v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Egidi) (Egidi I), 386 B.R. 884, 891 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008). 
 
81
 Coral Petroleum, 797 F.2d at 1356. 
 
82
 See, e.g., Hansen v. MacDonald Meat Co. (In re Kemp Pacific Fisheries, Inc.), 16 F.3d 313, 316 
(9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the “diminution of the estate” test had been developed to “test whether a 
debtor controlled transferred property to the extent that he owned it”); see also Manchester v. First Bank 
& Trust Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 650 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a payment a debtor 
had made to a bank from his employee benefit plan was not subject to earmarking because the debtor’s 
estate was diminished as a result of the transfer). 
 
83
 In re Barefoot Cottages Dev. Co., No. 09-50089-LMK, 2009 WL 2842735, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. 
Fla. July 28, 2009); see also Coral Petroleum, 797 F.2d at 1359; Tolz v. Barnett Bank of S. Fla. (In re 
Safe-T-Brake of S. Fla., Inc.), 162 B.R. 359, 366 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (funds were deemed earmarked 
since debtor exercised no dispositive control of funds sent to lien claimant); Hood v. Brownyard-Sharon 
Park Ctr., Inc. (In re Hood), 118 B.R. 417, 420 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1999) (mere possession of a check does 
not necessarily provide debtor with dispositive control of funds).  
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rather the transfer in question “merely substitutes one creditor for another 
without diminishing the value of the bankruptcy estate.”84 
In the context of credit card transfers, virtually no courts have held that 
the earmarking defense applies.  As in cases outside the credit card transfer 
scenario, most of these courts have also focused on the degree of control the 
debtor exercised over the transferred funds.  The Sixth Circuit has held that 
convenience check payments issued by one creditor and used to pay off the 
debt owed to another credit card company are not protected by the earmark-
ing defense.85  In Wells, the issue before the court was whether two $5,000 
convenience checks issued by the debtor’s bank and used to offset the deb-
tor’s balance on a different credit card account within ninety days of the 
date of petition filing constituted a voidable preference under § 547(b).86  
The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision that the payments were 
indeed voidable preferences.  The Wells court rejected the earmarking ar-
gument, observing that the new lender did not in any way restrict the deb-
tor’s use of the funds.87  In arriving at this conclusion, the court observed 
that the debtor had complete control over the use of the checks and could 
use them to “[t]ransfer balances, pay bills, make a purchase, [or] get extra 
cash.”88 Other circuits have held similarly.89   
IV.  PREFERENCES AND SWAP AGREEMENTS 
In what can, at best, be described as a throw away argument, in its 
conclusion of its appellate brief, both filed with the District Court and the 
Eleventh Circuit, Bank of America concludes  “a bank to bank balance 
transfer is nothing more than a ‘debt swap’ and the trustee cannot avoid 
[sic] pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 546(g).”90 
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 In re Kemp Pacific Fisheries, 16 F.3d at 316. 
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 Bank of Am. Corp., N.A., v. Meoli (In re Wells), 561 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2009).  The Sixth 
Circuit also held that the earmarking doctrine did not apply in the credit card balance transfer context in 
In re Dilworth.  See Yoppolo v. MBNA Am. Bank (In re Dilworth), 560 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2009).  The 
Dilworth court concluded that since the debtor controlled how the proceeds of the loan made by the new 
creditor were to be distributed; the funds were not earmarked for a specific purpose.  Id. at 565. 
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 In re Wells, 561 F.3d at 634. 
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 Id. at 635. 
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 Id. 
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 The Eleventh Circuit has not expressly ruled on which version of the earmarking test it would 
apply if presented with this issue.  See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Mukamal (In re Egidi) (Egidi II), 571 F.3d 
1156, 1162 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that the earmarking doctrine was inapplicable in that case because 
the debtor and not the lender designated the recipient of the transferred funds).  Judge Isicoff, however, 
in her bankruptcy court opinion suggested that the Eleventh Circuit had indirectly adopted the Bohlen 
test.  See Mukamal v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Egidi) (Egidi I), 386 B.R. 884, 891 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2008) (citing Am. Bank of Martin County v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc.), 845 F.2d 
293 (11th Cir. 1988)). 
 
90
 Reply Brief of Appellant, Egidi II, 571 F.3d 1156 (No. 08-15958-F). 
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In its reply brief to the Eleventh Circuit,91 Bank of America argued that 
a credit card balance transfer is a “debt swap” and therefore, pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 546(g), the transfer cannot be avoided as a preference.  Arguing 
that the definition of swap agreement in the Bankruptcy Code includes a 
“debt swap,” ergo “[i]f a debt swap cannot be avoided under Title 11 of the 
United States Code then a swap of debt should not be avoided either.”  This 
argument, such as it is, has no support in the statute. 
Transfers made “by or to (or for the benefit of) a swap participant or 
financial participant under or in connection with any swap agreement” are 
not avoidable under any Chapter 5 proceedings in the absence of an actual 
intent to defraud.92  A swap participant is defined as “an entity that, at any 
time before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding swap agreement 
with the debtor.”93  A financial participant is defined as an entity that, pur-
suant to different kinds of agreements with the debtor or another entity, has 
entered into certain transactions with a “total gross dollar value of not less 
than $1,000,000,000, or is a clearing organization.”94  A swap agreement 
includes a variety of different types of agreements that are used in the 
commodities and future markets.95 
                                                                                                                           
 
91
 Because the debt swap issue was not raised at the bankruptcy court level, and because no legal 
argument was put forth until the Eleventh Circuit Reply brief, the Eleventh Circuit held that Bank of 
America had waived this argument.   Id. 
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 11 U.S.C. § 546(g) (2009) provides in toto:  
(g) Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(1)(B) and 548(b) of this title, the trustee may 
not avoid a transfer, made by or to (or for the benefit of) a swap participant or financial participant, 
under or in connection with any swap agreement and that is made before the commencement of the 
case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title.  
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 11 U.S.C. § 101(53)(c) (2009). 
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 11 U.S.C. § 101(22A) (2009).  The full statutory definition of a “financial participant” is –  
(A) an entity that, at the time it enters into a securities contract, commodity contract, swap agree-
ment, repurchase agreement, or forward contract, or at the time of the date of the filing of the peti-
tion, has one or more agreements or transactions described in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6) 
or section 561(a) with the debtor or any other entity (other than an affiliate) of a total gross dollar 
value of not less than $1,000,000,000 in notional or actual principal amount outstanding (aggre-
gated across counterparties) at such time or on any day during the 15-month period preceding the 
date of the filing of the petition, or has gross mark-to-market positions of not less than 
$100,000,000 (aggregated across counterparties) in one or more such agreements or transactions 
with the debtor or any other entity (other than an affiliate) on any day during the 15-month period 
preceding the date of the filing of the petition; or   
(B) a clearing organization (as defined in section 402 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991).  
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 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B) The term “swap agreement” –  
(A) means –  
(i) any agreement, including the terms and conditions incorporated by reference in such agree-
ment, which is –  
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Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 546(g) in 1990 to “clarify the status of 
swap transactions and forward contracts in the event that a case is com-
menced under Title 11.”96  As introduced by Mr. Brooks, the purpose of the 
legislation is to  
                                                                                                                           
(I) an interest rate swap, option, future, or forward agreement, including a rate floor, rate cap, 
rate collar, cross-currency rate swap, and basis swap; (i) any agreement, including the terms and 
conditions incorporated by reference in such agreement, which is –  
(II)  a spot, same day-tomorrow, tomorrow-next, forward, or other foreign exchange, precious 
metals, or other commodity agreement;  
(III) a currency swap, option, future, or forward agreement;  
(V) an equity index or equity swap, option, future, or forward agreement;  
(VI) a total return, credit spread or credit swap, option, future, or forward agreement;  
(VII) a commodity index or a commodity swap, option, future, or forward agreement;  
(VIII) a weather swap, option, future, or forward agreement;  
(IX) an emissions swap, option, future, or forward agreement; or  
(X) an inflation swap, option, future, or forward agreement;  
(ii) any agreement or transaction that is similar to any other agreement or transaction referred to 
in this paragraph and that –  
(I) is of a type that has been, is presently, or in the future becomes, the subject of recurrent 
dealings in the swap or other derivatives markets (including terms and conditions incorporated by 
reference therein); and  
(II) is a forward, swap, future, option, or spot transaction on one more rates, currencies, com-
modities, equity securities, or other equity instruments, debt securities or other debt instruments, 
quantitative measures associated with an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency as-
sociated with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence, or economic or financial indices 
or measures of economic or financial risk or value;  
(iii) any combination of agreements or transactions referred to in this subparagraph;  
(iv) any option to enter into an agreement or transaction referred to in this subparagraph;  
(v) a master agreement that provides for an agreement or transaction referred to in clause (i), 
(ii), (iii), or (iv), together with all supplements to any such master agreement, and without regard 
to whether the master agreement contains an agreement or transaction that is not a swap agree-
ment under this paragraph except that the master agreement shall be considered to be a swap 
agreement under this paragraph only with respect to each agreement or transaction under the mas-
ter agreement that is referred to in clause (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv); or  
(vi) any security agreement or arrangement or other credit enhancement related to any agreements 
or transactions referred to in clause (i) through (v), including any guarantee or reimbursement ob-
ligation by or to a swap participant or financial participant in connection with any agreement or 
transaction referred to in any such clause, but not to exceed the damages in connection with any 
such agreement or transaction , measured in accordance with section 562; and 
(B) is applicable for purposes of this title only, and shall not be construed or applied so as to chal-
lenge or affect the characterization, definition, or treatment of any swap agreement under any other 
statute, regulation, or rule, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Legal Certainty for Bank 
Products Act of 2000, the securities laws (as such term is defined in section 3(a)(47) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934) and the Commodity Exchange Act. 
 
96
 Act to Amend Title 11 of the United States Code Regarding Swap Agreements and Forward 
Contracts, Pub. L. No. 101-311 (1990). 
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ensure that our financial markets are not destabilized by uncertainties 
in the application of the Bankruptcy Code.  H.R. 4612 deals with the 
treatment under the Bankruptcy Code of two types of financial in-
struments which are traded in the United States and international mar-
kets. One type of financial instrument is a forward contract sometimes 
referred to as a futures contract.  The other type of financial instru-
ment is a swap agreement, which, for example, allows a corporation or 
other large borrower to exchange a variable interest rate for a fixed in-
strument rate, to ensure stability of financial costs in his business.97 
And as noted by Mr. Fish: 
Today the many financial institutions that engage in exchanges of cur-
rencies and interest rates under swap agreements face needless uncer-
tainty about the potential impact of a bankruptcy filing on the right to 
terminate and net out transactions.  The stability of the swap market 
depends on the ability of a non-defaulting participant to terminate out-
standing transactions quickly; rapid changes in currency values and 
interest rates can make delay very costly . . . .  
The swap market serves essential functions today including reducing 
vulnerability to fluctuations in exchange and interest rates.  Explicit 
Bankruptcy Code references to swap agreements will remove ambigu-
ities that undermine the swap market.98 
The definitions in the Bankruptcy Code make clear that bank to bank 
credit card balance transfers, whether by convenience check or otherwise, 
are not swap agreements entitled to the insulating provisions of § 546(g).  
To the extent that there is any doubt whatsoever, the legislative history of § 
546(g)99 and its associated definition sections make clear this provision was 
adopted to promote and preserve the integrity of capital markets, not to 
supersede provisions of state law already in place that address more tradi-
tional banking relationships.   
V.  THE PERRY AND MARSHALL LOWER COURT DECISIONS 
Only two courts have held that a transfer by a debtor to another credi-
tor using the credit extended by a credit card company does not constitute a 
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, and therefore, does not con-
stitute a voidable preference under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code or a frau-
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 136 Cong. Rec. H 2282 (May 15, 1990). 
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 Id. 
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 Where statutory language is straightforward, there is no need for the courts to look to a statute’s 
legislative history.  See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997). 
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dulent transfer under § 548.100  In Perry, the debtor had made a payment to 
one of his creditors within the ninety days prior to filing for bankruptcy 
using his MBNA credit card.101  The Chapter 7 Trustee brought an adversary 
action seeking to avoid the payment to the creditor as an avoidable prefe-
rence under § 547.102  The Perry court began its analysis by examining the 
definition of the term “interest of the debtor in property.”103  The court cited 
the Begier104 decision to highlight the fact that the term “interest of the deb-
tor in property” should be read to coincide with the definition of property of 
the estate under § 541.105  The Begier Court specifically limited the scope of 
§ 541(a) by observing “if the debtor transfers property that would not have 
been available for distribution to his creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, 
the policy behind the avoidance power is not implicated.”106  The Perry 
court reasoned that unless the property in question “would not have reduced 
to cash available for distribution in bankruptcy,” the property is not consi-
dered property in which the debtor has an interest.107  The Perry court im-
plicitly rejected the “control” analysis adopted by previous courts by con-
cluding that a debtor’s credit constitutes merely “potential wealth” and that 
credit alone “serves no immediate benefit to the estate.” 108  The Perry court 
ultimately relied on the “diminution of the estate” framework in holding 
that the transfers to MBNA were not avoidable preferences or fraudulent 
transfers.  In arriving at this conclusion, the court noted, “[s]ince the pay-
ment was a transfer of mere credit, and did not affect the amount of liquidi-
ty or property available for distribution by the estate’s creditors, the pay-
ment was not a transfer of an interest in the debtor in property.”109  The 
court briefly addressed and rejected the earmarking argument set forth by 
the plaintiff because MBNA was not independently obliged to pay the old 
creditor.110 
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 See Loveridge v. Ark of Little Cottonwood, Inc. (In re Perry), 343 B.R. 685 (Bankr. D. Utah 
2005), overruled by Marshall v. FIA Card Servs. (In re Marshall) (Marshall III), 550 F.3d 1251 (10th 
Cir. 2008); see also Parks v. FIA Card Servs. (In re Marshall) (Marshall I), 372 B.R. 511 (Bankr. D. 
Kan. 2007), overruled by Marshall III, 550 F.3d 1251. 
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 In re Perry, 343 B.R. at 686-87. 
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 Id. at 687. 
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 Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53 (1990). 
 
105
 In re Perry, 343 B.R. at 687. 
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 Id. (quoting Begier, 496 U.S. at 58). 
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 Id. at 688. 
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 Id. 
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110
 The Perry court reasoned that the “earmarking doctrine was created to deal with the injustice 
resulting where the new creditor was independently obliged to pay the debtor’s debt, and thus was 
required to pay a debt a second time after the original payment was avoided as a preference.”  Id. at 688-
89. 
2009] Credit Card Transfers, Preferences or Protected 141 
 
The other bankruptcy court that held that credit card transfers were not 
avoidable was the bankruptcy court in the District of Kansas in Marshall 
I.111  In Marshall I, the bankruptcy court addressed the issue of whether 
payments made by one credit card company (Capital One) to another 
(MBNA) at the direction of the debtor constituted a preference under § 
547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.  As in Perry, the Marshall I court began its 
inquiry by examining whether the transactions in question involved a 
“transfer of an interest of the Debtors in property.”112  The Marshall court 
held that the transfers did not involve a transfer of the debtors in property 
because credit is not an interest “available for the satisfaction of creditors’ 
claims in bankruptcy.”113  The court further noted that a “debtor’s pre-
petition right to receive an extension of credit is not a right which can be 
utilized for the benefit of creditors of the estate.”114  The United States Dis-
trict Court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, observing that Capital 
One’s payments to MBNA did not exhibit “the requisite control on behalf of 
the debtor to impart a property interest.”115  The Marshall II court advanced 
a curious argument with respect to control, concluding that “an ability to 
direct where the funds go does not in itself give rise to a property inter-
est.”116  The court proceeded to adopt an intent-based approach which fo-
cused on the purpose of the transaction.117  The district court affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s decision concluding that the debtor never had control of 
the payments and that the transfer never resulted in a diminution of the es-
tate.118 
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s and bankruptcy court’s 
decisions.119  In reversing these decisions, the Marshall III court opined that 
the relevant inquiry was “whether the loan proceeds ‘would have been part 
of the estate had [they] not been transferred before the commencement of 
the bankruptcy proceedings.’”120  With respect to the debtor’s control over 
the funds, the court reasoned that the loan proceeds were “an asset of the 
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estate for at least an instant before they were preferentially transferred to 
[the old creditor].”121 
In its petition for writ of certiorari, FIA Card Services (“FIA”) began 
by reciting the holding of the Begier case.  The petitioners repeated the lan-
guage in Begier that “property of the debtor subject to the preferential trans-
fer provision is best understood as that property that would have been part 
of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of the 
bankruptcy proceeding.”122  Next, FIA asserted that the Tenth Circuit in 
Marshall III “had created a different legal standard than the one created by 
[the Supreme Court of the United States] in Begier v. I.R.S.”123  FIA argued 
that under the Begier standard, had the borrowed money not been trans-
ferred, the money would not have been property of the debtors, but rather, 
the property of the lender.124  This argument appears to be the central theme 
behind the petitioner’s appeal.  Additionally, FIA argued that the Marshall 
III decision created a conflict between the Tenth and Fifth Circuits.125  FIA 
cited the Coral Petroleum decision for the proposition that when one credi-
tor is simply substituted for another in the transfer context, there can be no 
preference since only the identity of the creditor has changed.126  Petitioners 
asserted that resolution of the “split” created by the Marshall decision 
would provide clarification as to whether a “direct bank to bank transfer of 
funds is a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property.”127    
The Supreme Court denied FIA’s petition for writ of certiorari.  Pre-
sumably, the Supreme Court did not find Marshall III to be in conflict with 
either the Begier or Coral Petroleum decisions.  
VI.  CONCLUSION  
With this denial of certiorari, the issue of whether credit card transfers 
can be avoided under § 547 has apparently been settled.  The appellate 
courts have held in no uncertain terms that funds lent by one credit card 
company to a debtor to pay off the balance owed to another credit card 
company will be viewed as a transfer of “an interest of the debtor in proper-
ty” under § 547 of the Code.  The recent appellate court decisions indicate 
that the courts will most likely take a rather expansive view of what consti-
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tutes “an interest of the debtor in property” and serve notice to lenders that 
provisional credit is an asset when used by the debtor even if the resulting 
transfer is merely a creditor switch.  These decisions are consistent with the 
Code’s underlying goal of promoting an equitable distribution of the es-
tate’s assets to creditors, while also providing future lenders with clear 
guidelines as to what types of transfers will be subject to the avoidable pre-
ference provisions in § 547 of the Code. 
 
